Optimal financial contracting and debt maturity structure under adverse selection

We analyze a model in which a risk-averse country finances its development project under asymmetric information. Before the project renders its fruits, two types of news will become available, one of which will reduce the asymmetry of information between the country and its investors. We characterize the optimal financial contract both when complete financial contracting is possible and when the country is restricted to using only short-term and long-term debt.

Dicritical nilpotent holomorphic foliations

We study in this paper several properties concerning singularities of foliations in $(\mathbb{C}^3,\mathbf{0})$ that are pull-back of dicritical foliations in $(\mathbb{C}^2,\mathbf{0})$. Particularly, we will investigate the existence of first integrals (holomorphic and meromorphic) and the dicriticalness of such a foliation. In the study of meromorphic first integrals we follow the same method used by R. Meziani and P. Sad in dimension two. While the foliations we study are pull-back of foliations in $(\mathbb{C}^2,\mathbf{0})$, the adaptations are not straightforward.Comment: 14 pages. Several mistakes corrected from the previous version. Several changes in the text, including a change in the titl

Higher spin vortical zilches from Kubo formulae

We compute thermal one-point functions in Maxwell's theory sourced by vorticity for the zilch and its higher spin extensions via the Kubo formalism. This leads to a generalization of the recent results of [M. N. Chernodub, A. Cortijo, and K. Landsteiner, Phys. Rev. D 98, 065016 (2018)PRVDAQ2470-001010.1103/PhysRevD.98.065016] to any spin, and their value suggests a relation with possible anomalies for the higher spin tower of currents.This work is supported by FPA2015-65480-P (MINECO/FEDER,UE) and by the Spanish Research Agency (Agencia Estatal de Investigación) through the grant IFT Centro de Excelencia Severo Ochoa SEV-2016-0597. The work of J. F.-P. is supported by fellowship SEV-2012-0249-03. The work of C. C. is funded by Fundación La Caixa under “La Caixa- Severo Ochoa” international predoctoral gran

Signaling Credibility --- Choosing Optimal Debt and International Reserves

This paper evaluates the challenges facing developing countries when there is uncertainty about the policy maker type. We consider a country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs, and sovereign risk, where future output depends on the type of policymaker in place today. There are two policymakers -- type T chooses debt and international reserves to smooth tax collection costs; type S has higher discount factor, aiming at obtaining current resources for narrow interest groups, and preferring not to undertake costly reforms that may enhance future output. Financial markets do not know the type of policymaker in place and try to infer its type by looking at its financial choices. We show that various adverse shocks (lower output, higher real interest rate, etc.) can induce a switch from an equilibrium where each policy maker chooses its preferred policy to another where T distorts its policies in order to separate itself from S in the least costly way. This is accomplished by type T reducing both international reserves and external debt. Further decline in output would induce type T to lower debt, and reserves would fall at a higher rate than otherwise expected.